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TROUBLE BREWING?  EU AND MEMBER-STATE PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY AND THE 
EUROPEAN BEER INDUSTRY
1 
 
 
Pamela Camerra-Rowe   
Kenyon College 
 
 
Summary 
  During  the  past  decade,  the  European  Union  (EU)  has  increased  its  competence  in 
consumer safety and public health.  Under Article 152 of the Amsterdam Treaty, for example, 
the EU is committed to ensure “a high level of health protection.”
2  This increased competence 
has  allowed  the  EU  to  extend  its  regulatory  reach.    In  the  summer  of  2005,  the  European 
Commission began to enforce a ban on advertising and sponsorship of cross border events by 
tobacco companies within the EU.
3  This includes a ban on sponsorships of Formula One race 
car drivers by tobacco companies.
4  The new Commissioner for Health and Consumer Affairs, 
Markos Kyprianou, warned the alcoholic beverage industry earlier this year that it must stop 
marketing its products to young drinkers or the EU will take action in this area.
5  Such Europe-
wide  regulations  have  been  advocated  by  non-producer  groups,  which  have  increasingly 
mobilized  in  Brussels.    The  focus  on  public  health  issues  poses  new  challenges  to  European 
business  and  has  increased  the  incentives  for  firms  and  trade  associations  to  mobilize  more 
effectively in Brussels in order to influence the EU’s regulatory policies.
6 
 
  This paper explores the political response of one sector of the economy – European beer 
brewing – to these new challenges. Beer brewing is an important industry in Europe.  Europe is 
home to five of the six largest global beer producers. European beer brewers account for 60% of 
the  world’s  beer  exports  and  30%  of  global  beer  production.  The  European  brewers  are 
represented in Brussels by the Brewers of Europe (BoE), which is a confederation of 21 national 
associations and represents approximately 90% of beer producers in the EU-25.  During the past 
few years, the brewers have restructured their trade association in Brussels and engaged in more 
aggressive lobbying in order to influence the EU’s policy-making process.  In this paper, I seek 
to  explain  these  changes  by  examining  the  increased  concentration  of  the  sector  and  the 
                                                        
1I thank Tom Allen, Martin Staniland, and David Rowe for their suggestions and comments on this paper.  
2While the Treaty calls for the EU to ensure a high level of health protection, it also states that the harmonization of 
laws and regulations of the Member States is excluded (Art. 152 para.4 lit.c EC Treaty).   
3Tobacco Advertising Directive (TAD2) 2003/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of Ministers of 
26 May 2003, Official Journal of the European Communities L152, 20.06.2003.  
4David Rennie “EU warning on marketing alcopops to young people,” The Daily Telegraph (London), March 5, 
2005, p. 15. 
5George Parker,  “Brussels warns drinks industry not to target young consumers,” Financial Times, May 2, 2005, p. 
9. 
6See, for example, Barrie Gilliat, “Operating in Contested Environments: The Experience of the Chlorine Industry,” 
in Justin Greenwood, ed.  The Challenge of Change in EU Business Associations, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003, pp. 123-135.  The chlorine industry reorganized its trade association in the 1990s in response to challenges by 
environmental groups.    2
increased attention to public health by non-producer groups such as Eurocare
7, the World Health 
Organization  (WHO),  some  national  governments,  and  the  European  Commission.    I  then 
analyze the extent to which the political activities of the brewers have shaped the debate over 
alcohol control in the EU. 
 
This case study on the European brewing sector and alcohol control policy allows me to 
explore several broader questions.  These include: 
 
- What is the impact of industrial consolidation on collective mobilization? 
- How have market liberalization and the increased competence of the EU affected the debate    
  over public health? 
 
- What is the relative effectiveness of industry and non-producer groups in the policy-making    
   process? 
 
  The paper draws on interviews with Commission officials, European and national trade 
association officials, and individual brewers, which I conducted in 1989-91 and in 2003-04.  By 
conducting interviews over time, I can compare the changes in the political activities  of the 
brewers  before  and  after  the  major  consolidation  of  the  industry  and  before  and  after  the 
emergence of major alcohol control groups and the accession of the Scandinavian countries to 
the EU.  
 
  The  paper  is  divided  into  six  sections.  The  first  section  outlines  the  economic 
characteristics  and  political  organization  of  European  beer  brewers  prior to the  1990s.   The 
second section explores the impact of increasing competitive pressures on the brewers during the 
1990s  and  early  2000s,  which  led  to  the  increased  concentration  of  the  industry  and  the 
emergence of five multinational firms - InBev, SABMiller, Heineken, Carlsberg, and Scottish & 
Newcastle.  The third section analyzes the activities of Eurocare, WHO’s Regional Office for 
Europe, the member states, and the European Commission to reduce alcohol-related harm.  The 
fourth  section  examines  the  political  response  of  the  brewers  to  those  activities,  focusing  in 
particular on the political reorganization of their European trade association and its lobbying 
activities  in  Brussels.  In  the  fifth  section,  I  discuss  the  impact  of  the  brewers’  political 
reorganization and lobbying on the debate over alcohol control policy in the EU.  Finally, I draw 
some conclusions about the changes in the brewers’ association and the EU’s policy-making 
process. 
 
 
1. The Economic and Political Structure of the Beer Brewing Sector Before the 1990s  
The Traditional Economic Structure of the Industry 
  The beer brewing sector is among the largest and most important food and beverage 
industries in Europe.  Beer brewing includes over 2,000 large, medium, and small breweries.  It 
                                                        
7 Eurocare is an acronym for European Council for Alcohol Research, Rehabilitation and Education.     3
employs some 140,000 people directly and over 4 million people indirectly.  European beer 
producers in the EU-25 account for 30% of all beer production worldwide.  The sector also 
contributes some 8.5 billion Euros annually to national government budgets in the form of excise 
duties.
8 
 
  Despite its economic significance, beer was a regional or national product for most of the 
post-WWII  period.
9  Th e  s e c t o r  w a s  d o m i n a t e d  b y  s m a l l - a n d  m e d i u m -sized  family-owned  
breweries.  Even the largest brewers, such as Heineken, tended to have a small number of export 
products and a limited market presence in foreign countries.  A variety of obstacles hindered the 
emergence of large, multinational European brewers.  Regional tastes in beer varied considerably 
and, while beer was the dominant alcoholic drink in some northern European countries, it was 
less important in much of southern Europe and in much of the rest of the developing world.   
Moreover,  national  barriers  to trade  made  it  more  expensive  for  firms  to  sell  beer  in  other 
countries and to find distribution outlets for beer.  
 
  The  most  significant  national  barriers  to  trade  included  differences  in  the  allowable 
ingredients in beer, in the allowable alcoholic content level, and in the size of containers.  For 
example, under Germany’s Reinheitsgebot or puri ty  l aw, the German government refused to 
accept most beer imports.  The law was established by Duke Wilhelm IV of Bavaria in 1516.  It 
required beer to be brewed using only water, hops, malt, and yeast.  No unprocessed juices or 
chemical additives could be used.  Brewers in other major EU member beer-producing countries, 
such as Belgium and Great Britain, often used such additives to prolong the shelf life of beer, 
stabilize the foam, or improve the taste.  Under a similar national purity law, Greece also forbade 
most beer imports. 
 
  In addition to differing national regulations, national and regional brewers were protected 
from competition by property and loan ties, which made it difficult for foreign brewers to find 
outlets in which to sell their beer.  Under property ties, brewers owned bars or restaurants and 
those establishments were allowed to sell only their beer.  Under loan ties, brewers provided 
loans to bars or restaurants in return for which the establishment agreed to sell only the brewer’s 
beer.  Brewers could also stipulate what other alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages could be 
served.  Property ties were critical to the economic survival of many small brewers because they 
guaranteed  a  retail  outlet  for  their  beer.    The  loan  tie  benefited  larger  brewers  by  saving 
advertising and marketing costs.  It also gave them a dominant position in their domestic markets 
since large firms had the capital to make loans to bars, restaurants, and hotels; an d f orei gn 
brewers had difficulties entering these markets. 
 
  The European Commission sought to remove some of these national barriers to trade in 
beer  in  the  late  1960s  and  early  1970s,  but  was  prevented  from  doing  so  by  the  German 
government.    A  Commission  proposal  in  1970,  for  example,  would  have  removed  national 
regulations restricting the allowable ingredients in beer.  The proposed directive was approved 
                                                        
8Brewers of Europe, “A First Submission in the Context of DG SANCO’s First Draft Working Paper on a 
‘Coordinated Approach in Europe to Tackle Alcohol-Related Harm,’” Brussels: BoE, September 2004, p. 6. 
9Much of the background on the beer industry comes from Pamela Camerra-Rowe, Lobbying in the New Europe, 
Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke University, 1994.    4
unanimously  in  the  Council  of  Ministers  but  was  withdrawn  in  1976  after  intense  German 
government opposition.  Germany had the largest number of small- and medium-sized brewers 
and these brewers argued that the removal of purity laws would threaten their survival. 
 
  Little further progress was made in creating a European single market for beer until 1979 
when the European Court of Justice (ECJ) established the principle of mutual recognition in the 
Cassis de Dijon decision.  The Court ruled that food that is legally produced and marketed in one 
member state must be allowed to be freely traded in other member states unless the importing 
country  could  show  that  the  product threatened  public  health,  consumer  safety, or  i ts  f i sc al  
authority.  Despite the ECJ’s decision, some member governments – most notably Germany –  
continued to block beer imports, arguing that chemical additives were a health risk to consumers. 
This was challenged by a French brewer in 1982 in the European Court of Justice.
10  The case 
was resolved in March 1987, when the Court upheld the mutual recognition principle in Cassis 
and ruled that Germany’s  ban on  imports was  illegal and disproportionate to the health risk 
involved.  The ECJ did allow Germany to continue to require that brewers in Germany brew 
under the Reinheitsgebot. 
 
  The lifting of purity laws initially led to few changes in the market for beer.  In part, 
Europe remained the largest market for beer and national markets continued to be protected by 
property and loan ties.  In 1983, the EU adopted a regulation (1984/83) that provided a block 
exemption for beer brewers for certain property and loan ties.  Beer brewers lobbied nationally 
for the exemption, which allowed domestic firms to continue to control much of the distribution 
in their national markets.  This regulation allowed brewers to have an exclusive tie for beer alone 
for a maximum period of ten years.  The regulation took effect on January 1, 1989 and expired 
on December 31, 1997. 
 
  Thus, for much of the post-WWII period, market integration had little impact on the beer 
brewing sector.  Creating a European single market or global market for beer was simply not 
high on most brewers’ priority list. 
 
 
The Political Organization of the Brewers 
  The limited impact of market integration on the beer brewing sector was reflected in the 
political organization of brewers in Brussels.  The brewers set up a European trade association, 
the Confédération des Brasseurs du Marché Commun (CBMC), in Brussels in 1958.  The CBMC 
was  a  confederation  of  national  associations.    It  took  decisions  by  unanimity  and  finding 
consensus  among  the  national  associations  took  time  and  was  sometimes  difficult.    This 
difficulty reflected the regional focus of brewers, the differing importance of beer brewing in 
European countries, differing national regulations, and the fragmentation of the industry.  When 
members  reached  agreement  on  policy  issues,  it  was  often  too  late  in  the  policy  process  to 
influence the EU’s policy agenda.  Instead, the CBMC functioned mainly to gather information 
about proposed EU policies.  But even here, it lacked the resources to do so effectively.  In early 
1991, just two staff people followed all technical, fiscal, social and environmental issues in the 
                                                        
10 European Court of Justice, Commission v. Germany, ECJ Case 178/84.   5
EU. 
 
  The CBMC office was located on the outskirts of Brussels, a considerable distance from 
the  Commission  and  European  Parliament  buildings,  which  added  to  the  impression  of  a 
marginalized organization.  After the passage of the Single European Act, the CBMC’s General 
Secretary  spent  much  time  on  the  phone  trying  to  explain  to  firm  and  national  association 
officials that the organization needed more money and support in order to follow the increasing 
amount of l e gi sl a ti on  c om i n g  f r om  th e  EU .  B u t s h e  s ai d , “ Th e  b i g g es t p r ob l em  i s  th a t th e  
national  level  is  still seen as the  most important, so it is difficult to get them to support the 
European association”.
11  Some firms viewed the CBMC as a nuisance or as ineffective.  Several 
smaller brewers said they never received information from the CBMC and some said they did 
not even know the CBMC existed.
12  Most of the brewers’ contacts and information came from 
their national or regional associations. 
 
  At the same time, by the beginning of the 1990s, more legislation affecting the brewers 
was being proposed in Brussels, including environmental and advertising legislation.
13  Debate 
about  the  adverse  health  effects  of  tobacco  and  alcohol  increased  within t h e  W o r l d  H e a l th  
Organization and in some member states.  In 1990, the alcoholic beverage industry set up The 
Amsterdam Group, which was supported by some of the largest European brewers, vintners, and 
spirits makers.  The group included Heineken, Interbrew, and Scottish & Newcastle, along with 
major spirits groups such as Bacardi.  Its goal was to promote responsible drinking in Europe and 
self-regulation in the industry and to participate in European level discussions on alcohol- related 
policies.  But the European brewers’ organization, CBMC, played a relatively minor role in the 
EU’s policy-making and agenda-setting process. 
 
 
2.  The Globalization of the European Beer Brewing Industry  
  Over the past 15 years, significant changes have occurred in the brewing industry due to 
changes  in  alcohol  consumption.  Overall  alcohol  consumption  in  developed  countries  has 
declined,  while  alcohol  consumption  in  the  rest  of  the  world  has  increased.    In  the  EU-15, 
average per capita alcohol consumption in 1998 was 7.3 liters of pure alcohol, down from 10 
liters  in  1987.
14  A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  a v e r a g e  p e r  c a p i t a  c o n s u m p t i o n  o f  a l c o h o l i c  p r o d u c t s  
worldwide increased 12% between 1990 and 2001, with the largest increases occurring in Latin 
American and eastern Europe.
15 
                                                        
11Personal Interview, Brussels, 02.28.91. 
12Pamela Camerra-Rowe, Lobbying in the New Europe: Firms and Politics in the Single European Market, Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Duke University, 1994. 
13In May 1986, the Council of Ministers passed a resolution that called on the Commission to take measures 
designed to decrease alcohol abuse in the member states (Official Journal C184, 23.07.1986).    In 1989, in the TV 
Without Frontiers directive, the Council stipulated that alcohol advertising not be aimed specifically at minors or 
encourage excessive consumption.  Council Directive 89/552/EEC.  
14Commission of the European Communities, Panorama of EC Industry 1990,  Luxembourg: Office of Official 
Publications, 1990, p. 15-75 and World Drink Trends, Henley on Thames: NTC Publishing, 1999. This masks 
considerable differences between countries.  Ireland, Greece Luxembourg and Portugal saw increasing consumption 
in the period, while Italy, France, Denmark saw decreasing consumption.   
15Adam Jones, “First the target was tobacco.  Then burgers.  So how has Big Alcohol stayed out of the lawyers’   6
  Beer  consumption  was  affected  by  these  trends.    In  2000,  average  per  capita  beer 
consumption in the EU-15 was 75.9 liters, down from 82.5 liters in 1980.  In some countries, 
there was an even starker reduction: in Germany, the largest beer market in western Europe, 
average per capita beer consumption decreased to 125.5 liters in 2000 from 145.9 liters in 1980; 
in the U.K., it was down to 95.4 liters from 118.3 liters.
16  Health concerns and the availability of 
alternative drinks, such as bottled waters and lemonade, depressed beer sales.  Consumption of 
bottled water, for example, grew from 29.1 million hectoliters (hl) in the EU in 1995 to 34.5 
million hl in 2000.
17  Not only were western European beer drinkers drinking less, but by the 
early 2000s in several western European countries, they were more likely to buy beer in grocery 
stores and consume it in their homes than in pubs and restaurants.  This lowered profit margins 
for the brewers.
18 
 
  In addition to an overall decline in beer consumption, there were changes in drinking 
patterns across western Europe.  In the period from 1970 to 1990, alcohol consumption in some 
of  the  highest  consuming  countries  in  southern  Europe  such  as  France  and  Italy  declined, 
whereas the consumption in some northern countries such as Denmark increased.  Moreover, 
some  countries,  including  Italy  and  France,  where  wine  had  been  the  dominant  alcoholic 
beverage type, and other countries including Great Britain, Ireland and Austria, in which beer 
was the main alcoholic drink, converged on a mix of around 50% beer, 35% wine and 15% 
distilled beverages.
19 
 
  The effect of these changes in alcohol consumption was to increase competition among 
beer brewers in western Europe.  Larger European brewers sought to consolidate their hold on 
traditional markets and to seek new markets in order to remain profitable.  As one firm official 
put it, “you had to buy or be bought.”
20  The highly fragmented nature of the sector allowed for 
significant merger and acquisition activity.  High transport costs and continued differences in 
regional taste meant that larger brewers often bought smaller, established brewers within Europe.  
Large brewers also aggressively pursued new market opportunities in eastern Europe, Asia, and 
Latin America, where consumption of alcoholic beverages was rising. 
 
  Among the most spectacular change in the sector was the emergence of Interbrew (now 
InBev),  a  company  that  did  not  exist  prior  to 1987.    Interbrew  was  created  in  1987,  when 
Belgium’s two largest brewers, Brasseries Artois and Brasseries Piedboeuf, merged.  Between 
1995  and  2004,  Interbrew  spent  $13.5  billion  on  42  purchases  and  joint  ventures.
21    The 
company  went  public  in  2000.    Interbrew  bought  many  local  and  national  brands  including 
specialty beers and lagers from around the world.  It owns such brands as Beck’s and Bass Ale.  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
sights?” Financial Times, July 8, 2003, p. 17. 
16  CBMC-Brewers of Europe, Statistics 2001, Brussels: CBMC-Brewers of Europe, 2001. 
17Eurostat, European Business Facts and Figures. Data 1990-2000.  Luxembourg: Office of Official Publications of 
the European Communities, 2002, p. 97 
18Adam Jones, “The drinks are in the house”, Financial Times, March 23, 2004, p. 16. 
19G. Edwards et al., Alcohol Policy and the Public Good, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, as cited in Peter 
Allebeck, “Alcohol Policy in Europe: What can the European Union do?”  European Journal of Public Health, 
2001, (11): 1-3.  
20Personal interview, Brussels, 04.01.04 
21Renee Cordes, “Interbrew Still Thirsty,” The Daily Deal, March 8, 2004, p. 1, (http://web.lexis-nexis.com).    7
Among its recent purchases were Gabriel Sedlmayr Spaten-Franziskaner Bräu (Spaten Group) in 
Germany  and  the  largest  Serbian  brewery,  Apatin,  in  2003.    In  March  2004,  Interbrew  and 
Companhia de Bebidas das Americas (AmBev) in Brazil agreed to establish InBev, which now 
has 14% of the global market share and is the largest beer producer in the world.
22 
 
  The second largest European brewer today, SABMiller, was not present in Europe ten 
years ago.  It began as a small South African brewing company.  The company moved first into 
other African nations, then to eastern Europe, China, and India.  In 2002, it bought Miller from 
Philip Morris in the U.S. and in 2003 it bought Peroni of Italy, Brouwar Dojidlyn in Poland, and 
d’Aurora in Romania,  making  it a global  brewer with significant European  interests.  It also 
established a corporate office in London. 
 
  Several other European  brewers  moved aggressively to establish themselves globally.  
Scottish & Newcastle, which is based in Edinburgh, bought several  major  brewers  including 
Kronenbourg, the largest French brewer; Scottish Courage, the leading British brewer; and Alken 
Maes, Belgium’s number two brewer.  It also bought Fosters and John Smith’s, and, in a joint 
venture, purchased Hartwell, Finland’s leading beer and soft drinks com pany .  Similarly , the 
Danish brewer Carlsberg acquired Germany’s second largest brewery, Holsten Brauerei, as well 
as Shumensko and Pirinsko in Bulgaria.  Since the late 1990s, Carlsberg has moved from being 
the market leader in only six markets to having market-leading brands in more than 20 countries 
and  sales  in  over  140  countries.
23  T h e  D u t c h  f i r m  H e i n e k e n ,  w h i c h  w a s  o n e  o f  t h e  f i r s t  
European brewers to engage in cross-border deals, also spent $3 billion i n  2002 f or a dozen 
acquisitions including BBAG, a family-owned brewer in Austria.  As a result of this merger and 
acquisition activity, five of Europe’s largest brewers – InBev, SABMiller, Heineken, Carlsberg, 
and Scottish & Newcastle – were among the top six global brewers, along with the U.S. firm 
Anheuser-Busch,  in  2004.  Their  interests  reach  far  beyond  national  boundaries  and  their 
resources have increased substantially. 
 
  In  addition  to  seeking  new  markets,  large  brewers  have  engaged  in  more  aggressive 
advertising and marketing in the last decade in order to promote their products and attract new 
customers.  Several of the largest brewers had to give up their property and loan ties in the 1990s 
and early 2000s as a result of changes in national regulatory regimes.  The British government, 
for example, set up the Monopolies and Merger Commission in 1985 to investigate whether large 
British brewers held a monopoly position in the United Kingdom as a result of property and loan 
ties.  The Commission concluded that a monopoly did exist among large UK brewers because 
they had the financial resources to dominate the pub and restaurant market.  It recommended that 
loan  ties  be  abolished  and  property  ties  be  limited  to  20  per  brewer.
24  D e s p i t e  v i g o r o u s  
opposition from the British Brewers Society and individual brewers to these recommendations, 
the British Department of Trade and Industry adopted regulations in August 1989 that required 
UK brewers with more than 2,000 pubs to release the tie on half the outlets in excess of that 
number and allow the tenants of those pubs to buy beer from any other brewer. 
                                                        
22Interbrew, Annual Report 2003, http://www.interbrew.com. 
23Carlsberg, Annual Report 2003, www.carlsberg.com. 
24Monopolies and Mergers Commission, The Supply of Beer: A Report on the Supply of Beer for Retail Sale in the 
United Kingdom, London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1989.   8
  This national deregulation was followed by European-level discussions on property and 
loan ties in the late 1990s.  The EU had passed a block exemption for loan and property ties for 
brewers in 1983, but this expired in 1997.  In 1999, the EU member states passed a new block 
exception regulation on vertical agreements.  Under the new regulation, only brewers with a 
market share not exceeding 30% of the domestic market could have a loan or property tie.  This 
went into force on January 1, 2002 and several of the largest brewers were forced to give up their 
remaining distribution outlets. 
 
  As  a  result  of  this  deregulation,  the  largest  brewers  had  to  rely  more  heavily  on 
advertising, marketing, and sponsorships to build brand loyalty, stimulate demand, and maintain 
their dominant market position.  Moreover, as brewers have entered new markets where beer is 
not a traditional drink, they have had to find ways of attracting customers through advertising 
and  marketing.    They  have  also  had  to  compete  head-on  with  the  spirits  industry  for  new 
consumers.  The consumption of spirits has risen in Europe in recent years.  Between 1998 and 
2000, one million additional liters of spirits in pure alcohol were sold each year in the EU.
25  
Greater competition with the spirits industry has led to greater expenditures on advertising and 
marketing.  In Ireland alone, the amount spent on alcohol advertising, excluding sponsorships 
and other promotional activities, increased from EUR 25.4 million in 1996 to EUR 43.2 million 
in 2003.
26  Similarly , in the UK, al coholic beverages are am ong the m ost heavily adverti sed 
products.  Annual expenditure in alcohol advertising rose during the 1990s and, with it, alcohol 
consumption of 11-15 year-olds also rose.
27  In 2000, £ 227.3 million was spent on alcohol 
advertising in Britain, with £ 129.4 million spent on beer advertising.
28 
 
 
3.  Political Change in Europe 
  The  increasing  competitive  pressures  in  the  European  brewing  industry  have  been 
accompanied by new political challenges for the brewers.  As national regulatory regimes were 
removed  and  the  availability  of  alcoholic  beverages  became  more  widespread,  public  health 
experts and national government and international organizations became concerned over alcohol-
related harm and advocated stricter regulation of alcohol. 
 
 
The Mobilization of Non-Producer Groups - Eurocare 
  Many consumer, environmental, labor and public interest groups mobilized in Brussels 
during the 1990s because of fears that the European single market would benefit business at the 
expense of other groups.
29  The Commission also sought to increase participation of these groups 
                                                        
25David Byrne, EU Commissioner for Health and Consumer Safety, Speech to British Beer and Pub Association, 
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in the policy-making process and even encouraged the formation of these groups.
30  In the case 
of  alcoholic  beverages,  an  advocacy  group  called  Eurocare  was  formed  in  1990  by  nine 
voluntary  and  non-governmental  national  organizations.    These  national  organizations  are  a 
diverse  group  that  provide  information  to  the  public,  educate  voluntary  and  professional 
community care workers, provide work place and school programs, and/or undertake research 
and advocacy on alcohol and alcoholism.  They include such organizations as the Institute of 
Alcohol Studies in the UK and ANPA (Association Nationale de Prévention de l’Alcoolisme) in 
France.  As the EU has expanded, so too has Eurocare. The organization now has 55 member 
organizations. 
 
  Eurocare was set up initially because of concern over the “negative effects of the Single 
European  Act  on  alcohol  control  policy.”
31    Member  organizations  feared  that  as  national 
restrictions  on  advertising  and  alcohol  consumption  were  dismantled,  alcohol  consumption 
would  increase,  and  so, t o o ,  w o u l d  a l c o h o l -related  harm.    Moreover,  in  1990,  the  alcohol 
industry set up The Amsterdam Group, a pan-industry social aspects organization designed to 
promote  responsible  consumption  and  self-regulation a n d  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  d i s c u s s i o n s  w i t h  
European policy-makers over alcohol control regulation.  Eurocare sought to provide information 
to policy  makers to counter the claims of the alcohol  industry and to promote public  health 
through the reduction of alcohol consumption. 
 
  Eurocare members argue that alcoholic beverages are different from other commodities 
in  the  single  market.   The organization classifies alcohol as a dependence-producing drug.
32   
Alcohol  consumption,  it  notes,  has  harmful  physical  and  societal  effects.    It  contributes  to 
disease and early mortality as well as to accidental and non-accidental injury and violent crime.  
In a recent report, Eurocare estimates that the total costs arising from the harm done by alcohol 
in European countries lies between 2% and 5% of GDP.
33 
 
  To reduce alcohol-related harm in Europe, Eurocare advocates policies that would reduce 
the overall consumption of alcohol.  These include a rise in excise duties on alcohol; a ban on the 
advertising of alcohol on television, in sports stadia, and in young people’s magazines; and the 
introduction  of  statutory  codes  of  advertising  practice  for  alcohol  advertising  with  financial 
penalties for infringement.  It also advocates establishing low legal alcohol limits for driving and 
enforcing these through random breath testing throughout the EU. 
 
  While  The  Amsterdam  Group  advocates  self-regulation  of  the  industry,  Eurocare 
members  argue  that  self-regulation  does  not  work.  “The  overall  aim  of  such  social  aspects 
organizations is to benefit their funding body, which is the alcohol industry, rather than public 
health or the public good,” it argues in a report.
34  Eurocare members argue that despite self-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Institutionalization of Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 
30Commission of the European Communities, An Open and Structured Dialogue Between the Commission and 
Special Interest Groups.  Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, SEC (92) 2272 final, 1992. 
31 Eurocare, A Summary of Alcohol Policy and the Public Good: A Guide for Action, 1995, http://www.eurocare.org. 
32 Eurocare, A Summary of Alcohol Policy..., p. 9. 
33Eurocare, The Beverage Industry’s Social Aspects Organizations: A Public Health Warning, 2002, p. 25, 
http://www.eurocare.org. 
34Eurocare, The Beverage Alcohol Industry’s Social Aspects Organization, p. 1.    10 
regulatory codes of  conduct, firms have been irresponsible in marketing alcoholic beverages.  
Eurocare points to specific advertisements using sexually explicit material and aimed at young 
people  to  argue that “ th e  b ev e r a g e  al c oh ol  i n d us tr y  i s  un ab l e  to r e g u l a te  i ts el f  a n d  i ts  s el f - 
regulatory codes are persistently and consistently broken.”
35 
 
  Eurocare  has  advocated  the  exclusion  of  organizations  funded  by  alcohol  beverage 
producers  from  the  European  policy-making  process  because  alcoholic  beverage  firms  are 
interested  in  increasing  their  own  profits  and,  hence,  increasing  consumption  of  alcohol.  
According to Eurocare, “[the] view of social aspects organizations that they have an equal place 
at the policy table fails to recognize that the evidence that they bring to the table is not impartial 
and favors the commercial interests of the beverage industry rather than the public good.”
36 
 
  Throughout the 1990s, Eurocare issued reports outlining the negative impact of alcohol 
consumption  but  it  otherwise played a limited role.   Within the European Union,  moreover, 
public health issues remained a secondary priority behind single market legislation for much of 
the  early  1990s.  However,  WHO’s  focus  on  tobacco  and  alcohol,  the  accession  of  the 
Scandinavian  states  to  the  EU,  and  increased  consumption  of  alcohol  among  young  people 
helped  focus  more  attention  on  alcohol-related  harm  issues.    The  EU  also  gained  greater 
competence in the public health arena during the 1990s.  As a result, Eurocare began to play a 
more influential role in shaping the debate on alcohol control policies.  It has been included in 
discussions with the Directorate General of Consumer Safety and Public Health (DG-SANCO) 
on alcohol control policy.  Brewers’ association officials said that Eurocare officials have been 
extremely well-organized for these meetings, oftentimes more so than the brewers have been.
37  
In June 2004, Eurocare organized a conference  in  Warsaw that  highlighted th e probl em s of  
alcohol-related harm in eastern Europe.  The conference was partially sponsored by the European 
Commission. 
 
 
The World Health Organization - European Regional Office 
  The European Regional Office of the World Health Organization (WHO) has b e en  a 
strong advocate of reducing the harmful effects of alcohol use.  The mission of WHO’s European 
Regional  Office  is  to  improve  health  in  its  51  member-state  region,  which  includes  all  the 
countries of the EU.  The European Region has the highest per capita alcohol consumption in the 
world and alcohol products are estimated to be responsible for 9% of the total disease burden in 
Europe.  It estimates that 25% of European men and 10% of European women consume alcohol 
at levels that are hazardous and harmful to their health.
38  WHO places alcohol  in the same 
category as other addictive substances such as tobacco and psychoactive drugs. 
 
  WHO’s Regional Office for Europe drew up a European Alcohol Action Plan (1992-99), 
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which was approved by the member states.
39  The plan called for per capita consumption of 
alcohol to decrease to 75% of 1980 levels by 2000.  To meet that goal, WHO recommended that 
countries develop national alcohol action plans and pass stricter drunk driving regulations and 
more rigorous rules governing the marketing of alcohol.  In response to the First Action Plan, 
over half of the countries in the EU region developed a country alcohol action plan and some 
countries did pass more restrictive legislation.  Only three member countries (Italy, Poland, and 
Spain) achieved the EU target of a 25% reduction in alcohol consumption.  Of the remaining 
countries  for  which  data  was  available,  11  countries  in  the  region  saw  a  decrease  and  11 
countries in the region experienced increases in the consumption of alcohol.
40 
 
  In 1995, members adopted a European Charter on Alcohol, which lays out five principles 
and ten strategies countries can use to develop comprehensive alcohol policies aimed at public 
health.  The principles include that “All children and adolescents have the right to grow up in an 
environment protected from the negative consequences of alcohol consumption and, to the extent 
possible, from the promotion of alcoholic beverages.”
41  The Charter was the basis for a second 
European Alcohol Action Plan, which was adopted by member states in 1999 and covers the 
period from 2000-2005.
42  This plan includes the following recommendations: 
 
– promoting high visibility, random breathalyzer tests;   
– reviewing current drunk driving legislation and adopting blood alcohol limits of .5% or lower; 
- developing tax polices that ensure a high real price of alcohol; 
- limiting the number of outlets where alcohol is sold and restricting the hours or days of sale; 
- restricting advertising to product information and appearance in adult print media; 
- restrictions on the sponsorship of spirits at sporting events. 
 
WHO  officials  also  became  increasingly  concerned  about  alcohol  use  among  young 
people.  At a conference on Alcohol and Young People in Stockholm in 2001, WHO organizers 
noted that some 55,000 young people aged 15-29 had died from alcohol-related causes in 1999 
and that for young men, alcohol was the biggest single killer.
43  Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland, 
Director-General of WHO, argued that there had been a new focus on youth by the alcoholic 
beverage industry during the 1990s and that the drinks industry had used marketing techniques 
designed to attract young people by focusing on “youth, lifestyle, sex, sports and fun.”
44  She 
sharply criticized the alcoholic beverage industry for targeting young people in its advertising 
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and  for  marketing  products  that  mixed  alcohol  with  fruit  juices  and  energy  drinks  and  for 
alcopops, which are sweet, fruit fizzy alcoholic drinks.  WHO officials recommended stricter 
advertising and marketing controls. 
 
  WHO officials also expressed concern over relations between government agencies and 
the  alcohol  beverage  industry.    Like E u r o c a r e ,  W H O  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  a l c o h o l  b e v e r a g e  
industry not be included in public health policy-making.  “Although some form of cooperation 
with  the  industry...cannot  a  priori  be  ruled  out,  [the  WHO  said]  there  was  no  support  for 
recommending that local and national public health alcohol policies in general be developed in 
cooperation  with  them.
45  W H O  of f i ci a ls  excluded  representatives  of  the  alcoholic  beverage 
industry from a meeting in 2002 on marketing and promotion of alcoholic beverages to young 
people at which the targeting of children and adolescents by the alcoholic beverage companies 
was sharply criticized.  After receiving complaints by alcoholic beverage firm officials, WHO 
officials have taken a more pragmatic approach and engaged in dialogue with the industry. 
 
  The  increasing  attention  to  alcohol  consumption  by  WHO  raised  concerns  among 
alcoholic beverage firms including the brewers.  They feared that WHO was targeting alcohol in 
the same way it had targeted tobacco.  Some public health experts argue that this is not the case, 
since WHO has devoted inadequate resources to alcohol control.
46  But in the past year, WHO 
focused renewed attention on alcohol consumption.  In 2004, WHO published its Global Status 
Report on Alcohol Policy, which suggests that member states need to do more in terms of alcohol 
control.
47  Ea rl i e r  th i s  y ea r , W H O’ s Ex ec u ti v e  Boa rd  called  on  member  states  to  “develop, 
implement and evaluate effective strategies and programs for reducing the negative health and 
social consequences of the harmful use of alcohol.”
48 
 
 
The Role of National Governments and the Accession of the Scandinavian Countries   
  While Eurocare and WHO have focused government attention on the harm caused by 
alcohol  consumption,  national  governments a r e  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  i m p l e m e n t ing a n d  e n f o r c ing 
policies regarding alcohol control at the national- or Europe-wide level. National governments 
retain  primary  responsibility  for  public  health, i n c l u d i n g  p r o t e c t i n g  c i t i z e n s  a g a i n s t  a l c o h o l -
related harm.  They have varied widely in their attention to alcohol control legislation.  France, 
for  example,  increased  its  national  restrictions  on  alcohol  advertising  in  the  early  1990s  in 
response to higher alcohol consumption among children and adolescents.  The so-called Loi 
Evin, passed by the French legislature in 1991 over the objections of the Chirac government, 
introduced a strict ban on alcohol advertising on television and on alcohol sponsorship of cultural 
and athletic events, as well as restrictions on other types of alcohol advertising.  It took effect in 
1993 and was the strictest legislation among the EU member states at the time.  At the EU level, 
the French government also sought to reduce alcohol abuse among children and adolescents.  In 
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its  work  program  for  the  EU  presidency  in  the  first  half  of  2000,  the  French  government 
expressed hopes of adopting a Council recommendation regarding young people and alcohol 
abuse.
49  F o r  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  G e r m a n y  a n d  The  Netherlands,  alcohol  control 
legislation  has  had  a  lower  priority  and  several  continue  to  have  voluntary  advertising  and 
marketing controls. 
 
  However, the accession of the Scandinavian countries (and particularly Sweden) to the 
EU in 1995, focused attention on the alcohol control issue and highlighted the tensions between 
liberalization  of  national  regulatory  regimes  and  public  health  issues.   Finland  and  Sweden 
strictly regulated alcohol sales and consumption in an effort to reduce overall consumption of 
alcohol  rather  than  targeting  specific  abuse  of  alcohol.  The  countries  had  low  alcohol 
consumption rates and low incidences of alcohol-related deaths.
50 
 
  Prior to accession, Sweden had the strictest anti-drinking regime in Europe.  Sweden’s 
alcohol  control  policies  reflected  the  tradition  of  people  often  drinking  to  the  point  of 
drunkenness.    Strict  alcohol  control  policies,  which  were  introduced  in  the  early  twentieth 
century, significantly reduced alcohol consumption and alcohol-related harm to one of the lowest 
rates in western Europe.
51  These control  policies included a m onopoly on the production of 
spirits; th e  i m p or ti n g , w h ol es al e , an d  r e ta i l  di s tr i b u ti on  o f  alcoholic  beverages  stronger  than 
3.5%  alcohol; c e i l i n g s  o n  p e r s o n a l  t r a v e l e r  i m p o r t s ;  and  exceedingly  high  taxation.  When 
Sweden  negotiated  its  accession  agreement  with  the  EU  in  the  early  1990s,  it  sought 
unsuccessfully to retain some of its restrictive policies.
52  The EU viewed such restrictions as 
conflicting with the  creation of a single  market, and Sweden reluctantly agreed to eliminate 
ceilings on personal traveler imports of alcohol by 2004.
53  Sweden also gave up its wholesale, 
importing  and  spirits  production  monopolies  and  replaced  these  with  a  licensing  system.   
Sweden was able to maintain its monopoly on retailing for public health reasons.
54 
 
  As a result of lifting national controls, alcohol consumption in Sweden has risen.  While 
alcohol consumption  in Sweden  is still  low  compared with  some European countries,  it  has 
increased 30% since 1995 and is now at its highest levels in 100 years.
55  Government officials 
have been particularly concerned over new products such as alcopops, which were introduced 
into Sweden in 1996, and which, under single market rules, the government can no longer ban.
56 
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  The Swedish government sought to raise its concerns and push for regulation of alcohol 
consumption at the European level.  When Sweden took over the presidency of the Council of 
Ministers in January 2001, for example, it proposed to develop a comprehensive EU policy to 
reduce the harmful effects of alcohol.  It held numerous meetings of the Council of Ministers of 
Health to discuss alcohol control regulations.
57  In June 2001, the Council of Ministers called on 
the EU to address the problems of alcohol among children and adolescents and suggested that 
member states take measures ensuring that alcoholic beverages are not designed or promoted in 
ways that appeal to children and adolescents.
58  The Council notes that it is “necessary to ensure 
that representative production and trade organizations demonstrate their commitment to these 
principles.”
59  The Council also recommended that the EU develop a Community strategy to 
reduce  alcohol-related  harm.
60  T h e  S w e d i s h  H e a l t h  M i n i s t r y  s e n t  a  n a t i o n a l  e x p e r t  t o  t h e  
Directorate for Public Health and Consumer Safety (DG-SANCO) for six months in the first half 
of 2004 to help draw up a comprehensive EU alcohol control policy. 
 
  Sweden  has  not  been  alone  in  its  concern  over  alcohol  consumption.  The  Swedish 
government has  been actively supported several times  in  its  stand on  alcohol control policy 
issues by the French and Finnish governments.
61  Moreover, surveys and reports published by the 
European Commission and national governments in the past few years have shown increases in 
binge  drinking  in  some  western  European  countries,  particularly  among  young  people.
62  
Alcohol-related harm has also increased substantially in some member states.
63  The widespread 
availability of cheap alcohol, the targeting of alcohol products at the younger market, and alcohol 
beverage promotions are believed to have contributed to the rise in consumption among young 
people.
64 
 
  The increase in binge drinking and drinking among young people has prompted some 
national governments to try to curb alcohol abuse.  The Irish government, for example, came 
under increasing public pressure to address underage drinking after a Dublin student was kicked 
to death by other students outside a pub.
65  A 2003 EU health survey indicated that per capita 
consumption of alcohol  in Ireland  had  increased by 45%  in the past ten  years.  Ireland had 
among the highest alcohol consumption rates am ong the EU-15 member states and underage 
drinking was also among the highest in the EU.  Irish drinkers were also more likely to engage in 
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binge  drinking  than  drinkers  in  other  EU  member  states.
66  A  s e c o n d  r e p o r t ,  p u b l i s h e d  i n  
September 2004 by the Strategic Task Force on Alcohol in Ireland, showed that each Irish adult 
drank the equivalent of 13.5 liters of pure alcohol in 2003.  It noted that binge drinking, which it 
defined as six or more standard drinks on a single occasion, was an especially acute problem, 
with nearly 60% of all visits to pubs leading to drinking binges.  The report estimated that in 
2003 alcohol consumption cost the country some EUR 2.65 billion in heal th care costs, road 
accidents,  alcohol-related  crime,  absenteeism  from  work  and  lost  productivity.
67  The  Irish 
Health Minister, Michael Martin, called alcohol consumption “public enemy number one.”
68 
 
  In response, the Irish government tightened its pub licensing rules in 2004 by setting 
earlier closing times on Thursdays.  The Irish Prime Minister also said that if it were not for 
single market rules, his government would have banned sales of alcopops.
69  On the European 
level,  when  the  Irish  took  over  the  EU  presidency  in  the  first  six  months  of 2004, i t m ade 
reducing alcohol-related harm one of its priorities. 
 
  The enlargement of the EU to eastern Europe also focused attention on the problems of 
alcohol consumption.  In Eastern Europe, alcohol consumption is higher on average than in the 
west.  Consumption of beer in eastern Europe has increased from slightly more than 67 liters per 
person in 1996 to over 85 liters on average in 2002.  In some countries, it is considerably higher.  
In the Czech Republic, for example, beer consumption averages almost 160 liters per person 
annually, compared to 124 liters annually per person in Germany, the highest in the west.
70  The 
five largest European brewers have been active in expanding their markets to eastern Europe and 
now control 73% of the beer market in eastern Europe. 
 
  Thus, the accession of the Scandinavian states and eastern European states to the EU, 
along  with  recent  reports  showing  increases  in  consumption  by  young  people  and  in  binge 
drinking in some countries, have focused attention on alcohol control regulation.  This interest by 
member states and the limited ability they have under single market rules to institute stricter 
national alcohol control policies has encouraged action in the EU. 
 
 
The European Commission 
  For much of the 1980s and early 1990s, the EU undertook relatively little specific action 
in  the  area  of  alcohol  control.    Much  attention  was  focused  on  the  single  market  program. 
Dismantling national regulatory regimes increased the availability of many goods for consumers 
in  the  EU,  but  it  also  raised  concerns  among  member  governments  about  public  health  and 
consumer safety risks.  This led EU member states to emphasize the need for the EU to ensure a 
high level of health protection in the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. 
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  The General Directorate for Health and Consumer Protection (DG SANCO) has played 
the lead role in seeking to reduce alcohol-related harm.  David Byrne, the former Commissioner 
for Health and Consumer Safety, made clear at the beginning of his term in office that he wanted 
to tackle alcohol abuse and to encourage cooperation between Commission services in doing so.  
He also promoted cooperation with WHO to meet public health challenges.  Byrne met with the 
Director General of WHO, Dr. Brundtland, in December 2000 and spoke at WHO’s meeting on 
Alcohol and Young People in February 2001.  He noted that “combating alcohol-related harm is 
a public health priority in many member states and also at the EU level.”
71  He challenged the 
alcohol beverage industry to demonstrate that it could effectively regulate itself and could take a 
responsible attitude toward young people and alcohol in its marketing and promotions. 
 
  After  the  WHO  conference,  the  Commission  prepared  a  proposal  for  a  Council 
recommendation on the drinking of alcohol by children and adolescents, which was approved by 
the Council in June 2001. The Com m i ssi on  recom m en ded th at m em ber states take m easures 
restricting the sale and advertising of alcoholic beverages so that advertising would not appeal to 
children and adolescents.
72  The Commission had already moved to create maximum authorized 
levels of alcohol in the blood of motor vehicle drivers.
73  It recommended in January 2001 that 
all member states should adopt a general level not exceeding .5 mg/ml and a second limit of .2 
mg/ml for inexperienced drivers and those operating larger vehicles or motorcycles. It wrote: 
“Making  AL  (alcohol  levels)  uniform  through  the  Community  would  certainly  send  a  more 
powerful message and provide a clearer reference.”
74  In July 2003, the Commission also issued 
a draft regulation to tackle unsubstantiated claims by the alcohol industry about nutrition and 
health.  Under the regulation, the EU would restrict nutritional claims for alcoholic beverages 
with an alcohol content in excess of 1.2% to those concerning energy and strength. It does not 
permit any health claims for such beverages. 
 
  The Commission  has  been slower to respond to the Council’s  call  for a community 
strategy to reduce alcohol-related harm.
75  DG SANCO drew up a first draft of a comprehensive 
plan to reduce alcohol-related harm in Europe in 2004 and sent it to stakeholders in July 2004.  
Since then,  it has  held  meetings with representatives of public  health organizations and the 
alcohol beverage industry to discuss the draft. In the working paper, DG SANCO proposed a 
more coordinated approach in Europe to tackling alcohol-related harm.  It has identified seven 
goals  it  hopes  to  achieve  before  the  end  of  2010.  These  include  decreasing  the  number  of 
alcohol-related road accidents; postponing the age at which children and adolescents may start to 
drink alcohol; improving enforcement of existing regulations on commercial communications; 
improving product information and common labeling; and combating harmful drinking patterns 
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such as binge drinking.
76  I t rec om m en ds such  acti on s  as un restri cted b reath  tes ti n g  an d the 
establishment of a minimum alcohol purchasing age of 18 in all member states.  It also suggests 
that self-regulatory approaches adopted by the beverage alcohol industry should be monitored by 
an  independent  third  body.
77  DG  SANCO  officials  hope  to  issue  a  final  Commission 
communication by the end of 2005. 
 
  In  April  2005,  the  Commission  also  sent  to  the  European  Parliament  and  Council  a 
proposal  which  would  establish  a  Community  Action  Program  in  Health  and  Consumer 
protection  for  the  period  from  2007-2013.
78  The  program  recommends  increasing  the 
participation of consumer and health organizations in EU policy-making. It also recommends 
that the EU promote health and prevent illness by reducing the growing burden of avoidable 
diseases related to life-style and addiction including alcohol use.
79 
 
 
4.  Changes in the Political Mobilization of the Brewers 
  The mobilization of non-producer groups and the increasing interest in alcohol control 
has made the brewers feel increasingly vulnerable to Europe-wide regulation.  Brewers suggest 
that there are more regulatory threats emanating from the EU than ten years ago or even six 
months ago.
80  This fear has led to changes in their organization. “The only way to respond,” 
according  to  one  industry  official,  “is  to  have  a  good  organization  in  Brussels  and  a  good 
national organization and relations between them have to be effective.”
81 
 
  The brewers want to ensure that the industry can freely innovate, promote and market its 
products.  This is particularly important for large brewers who rely increasingly on advertising 
and marketing in a highly competitive market.  The brewers also recognize that they need to 
differentiate  themselves  from  other  alcoholic  beverages  since  wine,  beer  and  spirits  are  not 
treated the same in the EU and the interests of the three sectors are not always identical.
82  For 
example,  wine  is  considered  to  be  a  part of  EU  agricultural  policy  and  is  governed  by  the 
Common Agricultural Policy, which differs from beer and spirits, which come under industrial 
policy.  Moreover, the consumption of spirits is sometimes viewed as a more serious problem 
than beer drinking because of the higher alcohol content of spirits and the fact that spirits are not 
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generally consumed with meals.
83  Thus, brewers needed an organization that allowed them to 
fight  their  own  battles  and t o  determine  when  to  cooperate  with  other  parts  of  the  alcohol 
beverage industry.
84 
 
  The  largest  brewers  initiated  many  of  the  changes  in  the  brewers’  European  trade 
association.  While  these  brewers  had  the  resources  to  set  up  their  own  lobbying  offices  in 
Brussels  (and some did), they often  found  it advantageous to lobby through the association 
because of the need for coordination and a unified message.  Moreover, the Commission and the 
European Parliament were sometimes more responsive to the appeals of small brewers than to 
those of l arge mul tinati onals and m ore willing to m eet wi th trade associati on officials. In the 
early 1990s, Commission officials were known to send back individual alcohol firm lobbyists 
without  hearing  their  arguments.
85 H e n c e ,  t h e  l a r g e  f i r m s  s o u g h t  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  t r a d e  
association, the CBMC. 
 
  To do so, CBMC members made several changes.  First, the association chose a General 
Secretary from outside the industry in the mid-1990s in order to “shake up the organization.”
86  
Members hoped that an outsider would be able to arbitrate better between the various interests 
within the organization and raise the profile of the organization.  Secondly, the members of the 
Brewers of Europe increased the financial resources of the organization in order to expand its 
lobbying and information gathering activity.  In 2002, the large firms and national associations 
agreed to increase the budget of the association by approximately 36%
87.  While the members 
have not reached that goal, they did increase the association’s budget 16% in 2003 and over 6% 
in 2004, so that it now has a budget of Euro 1.8 million .
88  The five major firms contribute 50% 
of  the  budget  to  the  European  association  through t h e i r  n a t i o n a l  a s s o c i a t i o n  f e e s  a n d  t h e  
additional money they spend on special projects.  In addition to increasing the general operating 
budget, the association bought a new building for its headquarters, located two blocks from the 
European Parliament. The building, which includes conference rooms where brewers can meet 
EU officials or hold receptions, officially opened in March 2004.  The association also changed 
its name from CBMC to the Brewers of Europe (BoE) in 2003 in order to make clear to public 
officials and the general public whom the trade association represents. 
 
  Third, in order to respond more quickly to new EU policy initiatives, the association has 
changed its decision-making procedures.  In March 2004, association members agreed to set up a 
presidential advisory committee, comprised of representatives of the five largest brewers and the 
association’s  vice  presidents,  one  of  whom  represents  smaller  brewers.  The  committee  is 
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designed  to  enable  the  association  to take  positions  on  new  issues  more  quickly.  While  the 
association does not admit firms as direct members of the association, some firm officials said 
this practice is likely to change over the next several years.
89  The association is also seeking to 
more  actively  involve  brewers  in  decision-making  by  having  them  (rather  than  association 
officials) chair committees, since they have the technical and practical expertise necessary to 
deal with issues in the EU. 
 
  Finally, since decision-making in the European Union increasingly occurs in a number of 
institutions, the association has broadened its lobbying channels.  It increased its presence in the 
European Parliament by setting up a European Parliament Bier Club, which now has close to 200 
members.  The BoE sends out a newsletter to members of the Bier Club and holds two annual 
social events for MEPs.  The association also established a communications department within 
the trade association in order to promote a better image in the press. 
 
  Along with the reorganization of the association, the tactics of the organization have 
changed.  In particular, it has become more aggressive in its attempts to shape the public debate 
about alcohol consumption and its own image as a responsible actor in that debate.  First, it has 
sought to educate the public about responsible drinking.  It has published a brochure outlining 
the education campaigns of member associations, firms, and the Brewers of Europe as a way of 
encouraging best practices in Europe.
90  These include initiatives aimed at discouraging drinking 
by  underage  minors,  and  initiatives  aimed  at  helping  parents  educate  children  about  the 
implications of drinking.  For example, the Belgium Arnoldus group, which is the social aspects 
organization of the Belgian Brewers, along with the Belgian Road Safety Institute, instituted a 
campaign in 1995 called BOB to make people aware of the dangers of drinking and driving and 
to encourage people to appoint a designated driver before a night out. The European Commission 
agreed in 2001 to fund similar BOB campaigns in other EU member countries because of its 
success in Belgium. 
 
  Secondly, some of the largest brewers and 11 of the national associations approved a plan 
in  November  2002  to  establish  and  pay  for  an  independent  research  council.  The  need  for 
independent research has grown as debates regarding the impact of alcohol consumption have 
increased.  In 2003, the Brewers of Europe set up the European Research Advisory Board as an 
independent foundation to fund bio-medical and psychological research into beer and alcohol 
consumption.  It  includes  an  advisory  board  of  eight  scientists w h o  r e v i e w  t h e  r e s e a r c h  
applications and advise the Board of Directors on which projects should be funded.  National 
association officials and firms agreed to fund the board for an initial period of three years with 
contributions of between Euro 400,000 and Euro 500,000 each year.  In 2004, they funded six 
research  projects,  which  included  research  on  alcohol-nicotine  co-dependence,  on  adolescent 
alcohol use, and on the relationship between the misuse of alcohol and various diseases such as 
cancer.  The  projects  will  take  two to  three  years  time  to  complete  and  the  results  will  be 
published in peer-reviewed, scientific journals, regardless of whether they are favorable to the 
industry o r  n o t .  The  research  board  reflects a  l o n g -term  offensive  strategy  and  association 
officials said it took time to convince members to spend money on research.  But the increased 
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public  debate  on  alcohol  misuse,  as  well  as t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ’ s  d e s i r e  f o r  s c i entific-based 
evidence  in  coming  up  with  alcohol  control  policies,  persuaded  members  to  undertake  this 
initiative.  As one official noted: “If you want to be seen as reasonable and credible, you can’t 
sponsor research which is not independent.”
91 
 
   Along with this, the association has focused on the positive health effects of moderate 
consumption of beer.
92  Recent research indicates that moderate consumption of darker beers 
might have a similar effect to moderate consumption of red wine in reducing the risk of coronary 
heart disease.
93  The association held its third Beer and Health Symposium in the fall of 2003 in 
an effort to disseminate these findings. 
 
  Finally,  the  association  and  large  firms  have  sought to  promote  self-regulation  as  an 
alternative  to  Europe-wide  regulation.  The  Brewers of Europe issued guidelines to serve  as 
common standards for advertising as well as other forms of marketing such as promotions and 
sponsorships.
94  In particular, they seek to ensure that commercial communications are targeted 
at people above the legal drinking age and that they do not encourage excessive or irresponsible 
drinking.  These guidelines do not replace existing national self-regulatory systems, but help to 
fill in gaps in countries where there is no national self-regulatory system, particularly in the new 
member states of eastern Europe. Trade association officials view this as demonstrating their 
commitment  to  effective  self-regulation  and  they  have  presented  these  guidelines  to  the 
Commission.  Individual brewers have also published codes of conduct.
95 
 
  The political reorganization and increased activity of the brewers’ association have been 
helped by the economic changes in the sector during the 1990s. The larger brewers have more 
resources  to  contribute  to  the o r g a n i z a t i o n  a n d  g r e a t e r  i n c e n t i v e s  t o  a v o i d  E u r o p e -wide 
regulations which might affect their advertising and marketing.  Moreover, the consolidation of 
the sector has meant a significant reduction in the number of firms. The theoretical literature 
suggests that the concentration of a sector will enhance its ability to undertake collective action 
since smaller groups have an easier time organizing collectively than larger groups.
96  Several 
national  trade  associations  said  that  consultation  with  firms  has  become  easier  with  fewer 
members although they admit that they have less room for independent action.
97  For example, in 
Spain, the number of active breweries has decreased from 34 in 1987 to 21 in 2004.
98  The major 
exception  is  Germany,  where  the  industry  is  still  highly  fragmented  with  1,279  breweries.  
However,  even  there,  several  well-known  brands,  including  Hannen  Alt,  Beck’s,  and 
Lowenbrau,  are  now  owned  by  large  foreign  companies,  which  decreases  the  overall 
fragmentation  of  the  industry.    Finally,  the n a t i o n a l  a s s o c i a t i o n s  n o w  s h a r e  t h e  s a m e  l a r g e  
companies as members, which increases the common interests across associations. 
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  At the same time, association officials admit that it is still difficult to come to agreements 
in the BoE on some issues because of continuing differences in both the markets and cultural 
perspectives on beer, particularly between southern and Scandinavian countries, and because of 
differences between small and large brewers.  Moreover, some national associations, especially 
those who pay the most into the budget, have sometimes been reticent to expand the activities of 
the European association.  But these differences have also been muted because of the brewers’ 
concerns over the public health debate on alcohol consumption. 
 
 
5.  Lobbying and Political Influence 
  One of the main goals of the BoE is to influence the EU’s public health debate over 
alcohol consumption. This debate centers on three related issues: 
 
1.  Is the problem overall consumption of alcohol or abuse by specific groups of drinkers? 
2.  Are education and self-regulation the most effective means of reducing alcohol-related harm  
     or are high taxation and restricted access to alcohol also necessary? 
3.  Should the alcoholic beverage industry participate in the policy making process? 
  Many Eurocare, WHO, and public health experts, along with some national government 
officials,  argue  that  the  best  means  of  reducing  alcohol-related  harm  is  reducing  overall 
consumption of alcohol.  They point to research which shows that when alcohol was less easy to 
acquire, alcohol-related harm went down.   They also suggest that education and self-regulation 
are  not  effective  for  reducing  alcohol-related  harm.  Robin  Room,  an  alcohol  researcher  at 
Stockholm  University,  argues,  for  example,  that  the  least  effective  approaches  are  alcohol 
education  in  school,  voluntary  codes  of  bar  practice,  providing  alcohol-free  activities  as  an 
alternative to drinking, and regulating the content of alcohol advertising.  The most effective, in 
terms of the demonstrated effects on rates of alcohol problems in the population as a whole, are 
increasing  taxes,  regulating  availability,  and  deterrence  in  the  context  of  drunk  driving.
99  
Finally, public health officials believe that the alcoholic beverage industry should not participate 
in developing strategies to reduce alcohol-related harm because of their commercial interest in 
increasing the consumption of their products. 
 
  The  brewers  agree  with  public  health  officials  that  inappropriate  consumption  of 
alcoholic products has negative physical and societal consequences and that misuse of alcohol 
should be reduced.  But they argue that policy-makers should target the misuse of alcohol by the 
minority of drinkers, rather than overall consumption of alcohol. They write: 
 
 
Across Europe, the majority of millions of adults who drink alcoholic beverages  
do so without causing harm to themselves or others.  On the other hand,  
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excessive drinking by a small minority of consumers can be harmful and  
is associated with many health problems.  Even infrequent drinking in excess 
by those who are typically responsible can result in significant harm.  Any  
strategy must therefore target alcohol-related harm and its causes without  
disproportionately interfering with the pleasure enjoyed by the millions of  
people who drink responsibly.”
100 
 
 
The  brewers  differentiate  alcohol  consumption  from  tobacco  consumption  by  pointing  to 
research that shows that moderate consumption of alcoholic beverages may have health benefits.  
They therefore argue that alcohol need not be regulated in the same fashion as tobacco and that 
the  benefits  of  alcohol  consumption  must  be  included  in  any  discussion of alcohol control 
legislation. 
 
  They also believe that education policies rather than restrictive legislation should be at 
the core of policies because they have been shown to be efficient and cost-effective in reducing 
alcohol-related harm. They  argue that  limiting the availability of alcohol can  have  negative 
repercussions by encouraging “unnatural attitudes towards beer” and creating uncontrolled and 
illegal production.
101  Finally, they argue that any policy-making must involve consultation with 
a broad coalition including the brewing industry since the industry takes the issue of alcohol-
related harm seriously and has experience in confronting it.
102 
 
  Analysts are divided over the ability of industry-funded groups and multinational firms to 
influence EU policy.  In a recent study, Paulette Kurzer emphasizes the influence of the alcohol 
beverage  industry on EU alcohol  control  policy.  She  writes: “ ...Eur ocare  carri es vi rtual ly  n o 
policy weight, especially not against French or Austrian wine growers, gigantic multinational 
beverage companies, and the free market philosophy of the Commission.”
103  Others also point to 
the influence of large multi-national firms on the EU’s policy process.
104  Still other researchers 
suggest that public health, consumer, and environmental groups are sometimes able to influence 
the regulatory process.
105 
 
  While it is difficult to measure the precise influence of the brewers’ association and the 
alcohol-beverage  industry,  more  generally,  on  the  policy-making  process,  there  is  some 
indication  that  the  brewers  have  had  some  impact on  the  alcohol  control  debate.  Unlike  the 
tobacco  industry,  the  brewers  have  been  included  in  the  discussions  of  EU  alcohol-related 
policy.
106 The BoE and members of other alcoholic beverage trade associations have participated 
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in discussions regarding DG-SANCO’s draft of a comprehensive alcohol control policy and have 
submitted their comments on the draft.  Part of the reason that EU officials have been willing to 
include industry representatives is that the industry admits that alcohol abuse is a problem and 
has taken the initiative to self-regulate.
107  Firms, national associations, the European Brewers’ 
Association, a n d  T h e  A m s t e r d a m  G r o u p  h a v e  a l l  d e v e l o p e d  c o d e s  about  responsible 
communication.
108 
 
  Moreover, the EU and most national governments have not targeted overall consumption 
of alcohol but have  focused thei r attenti on on probl em groups, such as y oung peopl e, binge 
drinkers, and drunk drivers.  It is primarily the Swedish government, Eurocare, and public health 
experts  who  advocate  reducing  overall  alcohol  consumption.  Part  of  this  reflects  the 
unwillingness  of  some  governments  to  target  alcohol  because  of  the  substantial  revenue  it 
generates, as well as a strong tradition in many European countries of viewing alcohol as food.
109 
 
   At the same time, the brewers have not been successful in convincing EU officials that 
education and self-regulation alone will solve the alcohol abuse problem. After a December 2003 
meeting  with  representatives  of  both  the  industry  and  Eurocare,  for  example,  Commission 
officials suggested that it should also focus on a mixed approach to alcohol-related harm that 
included both education measures and control policies.
110  In its draft working paper outlining an 
EU  approach  to  reduce  alcohol-related  harm,  DG  SANCO  also  does  not  discuss  education 
measures but focuses instead on restrictive measures.  While the Commission officials say that 
they are willing to see if self-regulation works, they hold out the threat of further regulation if the 
industry cannot regulate itself.  This suggests that the Commission is not completely dominated 
by  a  free  market  philosophy.  DG  SANCO  has,  for example, s h o w n  i t s  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  l i m i t 
tobacco  advertising  and  sponsorships  and  to  limit  trade  as  a  result  of  bovine  spongiform 
encephalitis (mad cow disease). 
 
  Moreover, the brewers are unable to affect all institutions within the EU equally. The 
brewers have focused most of their attention on the Commission and the European Parliament.  
But they are less able to influence the European Court of Justice.  Last year, the ECJ found that 
the  French  government’s b a n  o n  i n d i r e c t  t e l e v i s i o n  a d v e r t i s i n g  f o r  a l c o h o l i c  b e v e r a g e s  w a s  
compatible with Community law.
111  It ruled that France could  ban television channels  from 
showing shots of billboards advertising alcohol at sporting events. This has raised a new fear 
among the brewers and other alcoholic beverage firms that such rulings will encourage Eurocare 
and some government officials to seek a complete ban on alcohol advertising in the EU. 
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Conclusion 
  What is noteworthy about the European brewing industry is the degree to which it has 
changed  both  economically  and  politically  in  the  last  15  years.   In  th e  w or d s  of  on e  tr a d e  
association  official,  the s e c t o r  w a s  s t u c k  i n  t h e  M i d d l e -Ages  for  much  of  the  post-WWII 
period.
112  Markets were regional and the sector lacked an active and well-resourced brewers’ 
association at the European level.  Even as late as the 1990s, firms and national associations did 
not take seriously the threat of Europe-wide alcohol control legislation. 
 
The focus of WHO, the European Commission, national governments, and non-producer 
groups  on  alcohol  regulation  in  the  past  decade  has c h a n g e d  t h a t  p e r c e p t i o n .  A s  o v e r a l l  
consumption of alcohol in Europe declined and national regulatory regimes were dismantled, 
alcoholic beverage firms engaged in more aggressive marketing and advertising.  Single-issue 
groups  such  as  Eurocare  mobilized  to  focus  attention  on  the  harm  caused  by  alcohol 
consumption and advocate stricter alcohol control policies.  The accession of the Scandinavian 
countries to the EU and research showing increases in binge drinking among young people led 
some national governments to advocate stricter regulation of alcohol consumption. The increased 
competence of the EU in public health and the limits imposed by single market rules to restrict 
alcohol consumption nationally provided an opportunity for member states to push for Europe-
wide regulations. 
 
  The brewers have responded to these new regulatory challenges by restructuring their 
trade association in Brussels and engaging in more aggressive lobbying at the EU level. The 
association has had to invest more time and effort in public relations campaigns to influence the 
public debate and to promote its image as a responsible actor in the alcohol policy process.  To 
that end, it has focused on publicizing programs undertaken by firms and trade associations to 
promote  responsible  consumption  and  on  issuing  self-regulatory  guidelines  for  responsible 
commercial  communication.  These  new  strategies  are  aimed  not  only  at  national  and  EU 
government officials, but also at the media and the public. 
 
  The concentration of the sector and the emergence of five multinational beer brewers 
facilitated the political reorganization.  The larger firms provided both the impetus for reform 
and many of the resources necessary to undertake more aggressive lobbying activity.  Moreover, 
the concentration of the industry has meant that it is somewhat easier to reach agreement on 
issues. 
 
  The political reorganization and activity of the brewers has had an effect on the alcohol 
control debate.  EU efforts tend to be focused more on specific groups of problem drinkers, 
including young people and drunk drivers, rather than on restricting overall alcohol consumption.  
The Commission has also included industry officials in its discussions of alcohol-control policy.  
Both former EU Health Commissioner Byrne and current EU Health Commissioner Kyprianou 
have also said that the industry will be given a chance to self-regulate. But while Kyprianou 
views  self-regulation  as  preferable t o  h i g h  t a x e s  o r  n e w  r e g u l a t i o n s ,  h e  d o e s  m a i n t a i n  the 
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possibility of Europe-wide regulation as a last resort.
113 Moreover, the policy process in the EU 
is very pluralistic. The beer brewers are only one of a number of stakeholders involved in the 
policy  process.    Eurocare  and  public  health  experts  have  persuaded  the  Commission  that  a 
combination of education and regulatory measures may be necessary to reduce alcohol-related 
harm in the EU. 
 
  Moreover, although alcoholic beverage firms have established voluntary self-advertising 
and marketing guidelines and are promoting responsible drinking, they face a great temptation to 
cheat, given the increased competitive pressures in the industry.  Brewing officials admit that the 
increased competition among firms has led some of the larger alcoholic beverage firms to push 
the boundaries in terms of advertising and sponsorship.
114  Pat Barry, head for corporate relations 
at Diageo, the spirits manufacturer, said: “It is fair to say that the drinks industry pushed to the 
boundary and beyond the boundary.”
115  This suggests that the EU or national governments may 
need  to  set  up  an  independent  regulatory  body  to  monitor  the  self-regulatory  efforts  of  the 
industry or the industry may need to use financial penalties to enforce the rules. 
 
Self-regulation also has not curbed binge drinking and drinking among young people. 
This  has  increased  the  public  health  costs  of  some  EU  governments.  Despite  the  alcohol 
beverage  industry’s  significant  contributions  to  national  government  budgets,  the  costs 
associated with alcohol-related harm may lead national governments to pursue stricter alcohol 
control policies.  Thus, even with more effective political lobbying, European beer brewers may 
be unable to avoid some kind of Europe-wide alcohol control policy. 
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